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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 880536-CA

vs,

Priority Two

FRANK JOSEPH IRISH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the court's instructions to Appellant to seat

himself and to not leave the courtroom without authorization
constitute reversible error?
2.

Even if the court's comments were inappropriate,

were they harmless error under the undisputed facts of this
case?
3.

Was sufficient evidence presented during the trial

to support the jury's finding that Appellant was guilty of
driving under the influence of alcohol?
4.

Does the failure of Appellant-Irish to object during

the trial to the court's comments to Appellant in the jury's
presence, or to move for dismissal or for a directed verdict
or for a new trial regarding that issue or regarding the

alleged insufficiency of evidence, constitute a waiver of his
right to appeal as to those issues?
II
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Driving under the
Influence of Alcohol, a violation of Section 12.24.100, Salt
Lake City Code, a Class B misdemeanor, and from a conviction
of Making an Improper Lane Change, a violation of Section
12.44.060, Salt Lake City Code, an infraction, following a
jury trial in the Third Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake
Department, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston presiding.
Ill
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant-Irish was convicted by a jury in the Third
Circuit Court of violating City ordinances (1) prohibiting
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, (2) prohibiting moving from one clearly marked lane
of traffic to another without giving the right-of-way to
vehicles in the lane to be entered, nor untiL the driver has
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety
and such driver has given the prescribed signal, and (3)
prohibiting driving a vehicle without a valid Utah operator's
license while such license was suspended.

Appellant now seeks

relief from the Utah Court of Appeals, claiming that
reversible error was made by the court in instructing
Appellant, during the course of the trial, to be seated and
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not to leave the courtroom without authorization and further
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and
improper lane change.
IV
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS
Appellant-Irish was convicted by a jury in the Third
Circuit Court.

No motion for new trial nor for certificate of

probable cause was filed.
V
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts, when viewed in a light favorable to upholding
the jury verdict, demonstrate the following:
1.

On July 13, 1988 at approximately 10:35 p.m. the

arresting officer and a companion officer observed AppellantIrish operating a motor vehicle which was stopped in the
center east bound lane at the intersection of 800 West and
North Temple Streets in Salt Lake City Utah.

As the officers

approached on their motorcycles from the rear the Appellant's
vehicle remained stopped at the intersection, with its engine
running, although the semaphore light had turned green.
(Tr-50).
2.

Approximately half to three quarters of the way

through the green-light cycle the Appellant?s vehicle
proceeded forward at a very slow rate of speed.

At no time

while it was under the observation of the officers did the

Appellant's vehicle exceed eight to ten miles per hour,
although the speed limit in that area was 35 miles per hour.
As the vehicle proceeded eastward it drifted to the right,
without giving any turning signal, until it was nearly
completely in the right lane rather than in the center lane
where it had been.
center lane.
3.

The vehicle then veered back into the

(Tr-50,51,71,72 ).

Upon observing the illegal lane change the officers

initiated the red and blue flashing lights on their motorcycles, while traveling behind the Appellant vehicle.

The

Appellant continued to travel approximately another 150 to 200
feet and showed no reaction to the flashing lights.

At that

time the officers initiated their sirens, and again there was
no reaction from the Appellant.

The officers initiated their

sirens once again whereupon the Appellant vehicle started a
very, very slow movement into the right lane and continued in
the right lane for approximately another 200 feet at a very
slow rate of speed before pulling off the road into a parking
lot.

(Tr-53,54).
4.

The arresting officer approached the vehicle and

asked Appellant-Irish for his driver's license.

The subject

indicated he did not have one and that it had been suspended
or taken away.

At that time the officer detected the odor of

an alcoholic beverage coming from the Appellant's vehicle and
about his person.

(Tr-54,55).
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5.

Upon request, Appellant-Irish got out of the car.

He opened the door, swung his feet out, and used both hands
not only in the door-jam but on the door itself to lift
himself out of the vehicle.

As he walked toward the back of

the vehicle his movement was slow.

He ran his hand all the

way along the side of the car for balance as he walked.

The

odor of alcohol was prevalent, coming solely from AppellantIrish's person rather than also from within the car as before.
(Tr-56,57).

The officer observed that Appellant-Irish had a

hard time speaking.

His speech was slurred and repetitive.

He continued asking the same questions of the officer timeafter-time although the officer answered the same questions
several times.
and glassy.
6.

In addition, Appellant's eyes were bloodshot

(Tr-57).

Thereafter, the officer had Appellant-Irish perform

three field sobriety tests (Tr-61-67):

a hand slapping test,

a finger counting test, and a straight line test.
failed each test; he:

Mr. Irish

(a) was unable to follow the instruc-

tions on the hand slapping test, and he kept hitting one hand
two or three times on one side and joking about the test, even
after being shown a second time how to perform it (Tr-63-65);
(b) he tried the finger counting test, but did not actually
count the fingers but simply recited various numbers at random
while sliding his thumb around his fingers (Tr-64,66); and (c)
on attempting the straight line test, he took four steps with
his feet at angles rather than in a straight line and not

touching his heel to his toe, and then he fell over against
his car and stated that he was finished with the test and did
not complete it as instructed (Tr-66,67).

After the tests

were performed, the arresting officer placed Appellant-Irish
under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
(Tr-68).
7.

Prior to transporting him to the police station, the

arresting officer advised Appellant-Irish that he wanted him
to take an intoxilyzer test to determine his blood alcohol
content.

Appellant was quite belligerent and stated that he

was not going to take any test of any sort.
8.

(Tr-68).

After being transported to the police station,

Appellant-Irish was shown the intoxilyzer instruments and he
was given a demonstration of its characteristics and how the
test would be administered.

Appellant again refused to take

the test and made a rude comment to the officers about where
they could put the machine.
9.

(Tr-69).

The officer then read to Appellant a written

admonition which advised him that if he refused to take the
intoxilyzer test his privilege to drive a motor vehicle may be
revoked for one year.

Even after hearing that admonition,

Appellant refused to take the test, and therefore it was not
administered.
10.

(Tr-69,70).

During the entire period that the field sobriety

tests were administered as well as during the discussions
regarding the intoxilyzer at the police station, Appellant-
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Irish was belligerent, using vulgarity and profanity.

He

stated that he had large friends who were going to come and
take care of the police officers after the incident was over,
and vulgarly described what they could do with the intoxilyzer
instrument.

The officers did not retort or otherwise respond

to Appellant-Irish1s belligerence.
11.

(Tr-64,68,69,78,79,86 ) .

A jury trial was held on September 1, 1988.

During

the voir dire, the prosecutor brought to the court's attention
that the Appellant-Irish had left the courtroom.

The defense

attorney advised the court that Appellant had left and that
the attorney had not excused him.

The judge commented that he

had not excused Appellant either and decided to proceed in
Appellant-Irish's absence.
12.

(Tr-32).

At the commencement of the afternoon session of the

trial following the noon recess, the prosecutor requested that
the record reflect that neither Appellant-Irish nor his
counsel were present in the courtroom.
that fact and proceeded with the trial.

The judge acknowledged
Shortly thereafter

defense counsel appeared in the courtroom without AppellantIrish.

The court allowed defense counsel time to telephone

his office or otherwise to try to locate his client.

After

some time had elapsed and Appellant-Irish had not been located
the court decided to proceed in Appellant's absence once
again.
13.

(Tr-46-48).
Upon Appellant's finally arriving in the courtroom

the judge instructed him as follows:

"Mr. Irish, I want you to come up here and sit at
this table and I am instructing you by order of this
court that you are not to leave this courtroom
unless and until you are so authorized by this
court.
Why don't you sit over there next to your
counsel. Do you understand what Ifm saying to you?"
(Tr-46-48).
14.

At the conclusion of the defendant's case and prior

to the administering of jury instructions, the court stated
that they would take a brief five minute recess.

Prior to the

recess the judge addressed defense counsel:
"And Mr. Loyd will you stay with your client?"
Mr. Loyd then stated that he would do so.
15.

(Tr-107).

During cross examination Appellant-Irish admitted

that he had had two cans of beer prior to his arrest:
his home and one at his friend's home.

one at

(Tr-105,106) .

VI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

No Prejudice.

The court's simple instructions to Appellant that he not
leave the courtroom without authorization were in accordance
with the court's discretion to control courtroom decorum they
were justified by Appellant's own actions, and they did not
suggest partiality.

Any possible prejudice was cured by the

court's instructions.
2.

Harmless Error.

Even if the court's comments were error, they were
harmless error in view of the overwhelming additional evidence
presented at trial indicating Appellant's guilt.
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3.

Sufficient Evidence.

The jury's findings that Appellant was guilty of driving
under the influence of alcohol and of improper lane change
were supported by sufficient evidence presented at trial.
4.

Appeal Waiver.

Appellant-Irish has waived both of the issues raised on
appeal due to his failure to properly preserve those issues at
the trial court level.
VII
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTING APPELLANT IN THE JURY'S
PRESENCE REGARDING COURTROOM DECORUM
A.

THE COURT HAS JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO
CONTROL COURTROOM DECORUM

The trial court's instruction to Appellant-Irish, during
the jury trial in this case, that he seat himself at his
counsel's table and that he not leave the courtroom unless
authorized to do so by the court was the result of Appellant's
own actions during the trial and was an appropriate exercise
of the court's discretion in controlling courtroom decorum.
During the jury voir dire the defendant left the courtroom
without the court's authorization or his own counsel's
authorization.

That fact was brought to the court's

attention, which determined to proceed with the voir dire in
Appellant's absence.

(Tr-32).

At the commencement of the afternoon session following
the noon recess, the court noted that neither Appellant-Irish
nor his counsel were present in the courtroom.
proceeded in their absence.

The court

Shortly thereafter Appellant's

counsel arrived without his client.

The court gave

Appellant's counsel some time to make a telephone call to his
office or otherwise to attempt to locate Appellant, but
counsel was unsuccessful.

The court then proceeded once again

with the trial in Appellant's absence.

When Appellant

eventually arrived in the courtroom, the judge instructed him
to be seated and to not leave without the court's
authorization.

Those comments by the court constituted a

clear and justified attempt to avoid further disruptions of
the trial as had already occurred twice during the trial.
Nothing in the trial record suggests that the court's comments
to Appellant were other than courteous and judicious.

Nothing

in those comments suggested a lack of impartiality on the part
of the judge nor did they pertain to the merits of the case.
(Tr-46-48).
In the administration of justice, the judge is charged
with the preservation of order in the court and with the duty
to see that justice is not obstructed by any person or persons
whatsoever.

A measure of discretion resides in the court in

this respect, and its exercise will not be reviewed or
disturbed on appeal unless it appears that prejudice resulted
from the denial of a legal right.
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75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, §40.

The manner of maintaining order in the courtroom is
within the trial judge's sound discretion and will depend upon
the type of disruption before him.
559, 563 (Wash.App. 1975).

Burgess v. Towne, 538 P.2d

See also Standard 6-3.3 of the

American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Function of
the Trial Judge, Second Edition, and Canon 3, subparagraph
(A)(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct (adopted March 1,
1974; revised effective May 18, 1987) regarding a trial
judge's obligation to maintain order and decorum in
proceedings before the court..

In Illinois v. Allen the

United States Supreme Court stated:
"It is essential to the proper administration of
criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be
the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our
country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of
elementary standards of proper conduct should not
and cannot be tolerated.
We believe trial judges
confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly
defiant
defendants
must
be
given
sufficient
discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.
No one formula for maintaining the appropriate
courtroom
atmosphere
will
be
best
in
all
situations." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343;
90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061; 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 359 (1970)
B.

THE COURT f S COMMENTS WERE
NOT PREJUDICIAL

In determining whether a trial judge's remarks to an
accused in a criminal case may prejudice the minds of the
jurors against the accused sufficiently to constitute
reversible error, the courts have frequently considered a
number of factors in relation to the remarks.

Those factors

include the circumstances under which, and the matter in
which, such remarks were made, as well as the peculiar impact

of such remarks on the case itself, the existence or lack, of
justification or excuse for such remarks, and the curative
effects of any subsequent action or statements by the judge
seeking to palliate or remove the prejudice engendered by such
remarks.

34 ALR.3d 1313, 1318, §2.

See also 75 Am.Jur.2d

Trial, §106.
The instances in which such judicial comments have been
held to be reversible error have generally been those in which
there was no justification for the judge's comments, or which
manifested a hostile attitude toward the defendant, or which
expressed an opinion that the defendant was guilty or
otherwise suggested a lack of impartiality by the judge.
ALR.3d 1313, §25(a); 75 Am.Jur.2d, §106.

34

On the other hand,

many courts have ruled that in the absence of such prejudicial
elements, comments made by the trial court in an attempt to
control courtroom decorum do not constitute reversible error.
34 ALR.3d 1313, §25(b).
In a situation quite similar to the Appellantfs herein, a
reversal of a defendant's conviction was held not to be
mandated by the trial court's actions or comments relating to
the tardiness of the defendant in appearing before the court
and the delay occasioned thereby, in the presence of
prospective jurors and those chosen for the panel which
ultimately decided the defendant's guilt.
361 N.E.2d 13 (111. 1977).

People v. McCord,

In McCord it was held that the

comments by the trial judge, reasonably construed, did not
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indicate any opinion as to the facts of the case or of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, and that the conduct of the
trial court did not bespeak prejudice to the defendant.

See

also State v. Greene, 206 S.E.2d (NC 1974); State v. Brewer,
301 So.2d 630 (LA 1974).
The judge's comments in the instant case were similar to
those made in McCord.

They were justified by Appellant's own

actions, they did not indicate any opinion as to the facts of
the case or Appellant's guilt or innocence, and they did not
bespeak prejudice to the accused.
C.

ANY POSSIBLE PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT
WAS CURED BY THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS

In the event the trial judge's comments to AppellantIrish set forth hereinabove could be interpreted as in some
way prejudicing the jury toward Appellant, such prejudice was
cured by jury instructions given by the court at the conclusion of the trial.

Instruction No. 1 advised the jury that in

determining the facts, it may consider only the evidence given
at the trial.

(Record, 21; attached hereto as Exhibit " A " ) .

Instruction No. 14 stated as follows:
"If during this trial the court has said or done
anything which has suggested to you that it is
inclined to favor the claims or position of either
party, you will not permit yourselves to be
influenced by any such suggestion.
"The court has not intended to indicate any opinion
as to which witness are or are not worthy of
belief, nor which party should prevail.
If any
expression has seemed to indicate an opinion
relating to any of these matters, you should
disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges
of the facts."
(Record, 35; attached hereto as
Exhibit " B " ) .
_i Q _

Although defense counsel did not make objection to the
court's comments at the time they were made or otherwise
suggest any curative admonition at that time, the aforementioned instructions were given by the court expressly for
the purpose of curing any potential prejudice which may have
resulted from such statement or action as objected to by
Appellant on this appeal.

Such instructions have generally

been found to be effective in dispelling possible prejudice
where the prejudice is not so substantial or manifest that it
cannot reasonably be cured by such jury instructions.

See

United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595 (1987, CA6 K Y ) ; United
States v. Marshall, 767 F.2d 293 (1985, CA6 Tenn); 34 ALR.3d
1313, §5.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTING APPELLANT
WAS INAPPROPRIATE, IT CONSTITUTED HARMLESS
ERROR UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE
The other evidence in this case of Appellant-Irish's
guilt is so overwhelming, that even if the comments of the
trial judge were prejudicial, they were harmless error.

The

facts which support the jury's verdict in this case include
the following:
1.

As Appellant-Irish operated his vehicle he failed to

move forward after a semaphore light had turned green through
approximately half to three quarters of the way through the
green-light cycle.

(Tr-50).
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2.

When he finally did proceed forward he did so at an

unusually slow rate of speed, not exceeding 8-10 miles per
hour during the entire time he was under the officers'
observation despite a speed limit in that area of 35 miles per
hour.

(Tr-51,71).
3.

His vehicle drifted into the next lane of traffic

without his giving a turning signal and then abruptly veered
back into the original lane.

(Tr-51,71).

Despite the officers1 initiating the red and blue

4.

flashing lights on their motorcycles Appellant continued to
travel approximately another 150 to 200 feet showing no
reaction to the flashing lights.

When the officers initiated

their sirens the first time there was no reaction from
Appellant.

Only after the officers initiated their sirens a

second time did the Appellant react by moving very very slowly
to the right of the roadway and traveling approximately
another 200 feet before pulling off the road into a parking
lot.

(Tr-53,54).
5.

Appellant-Irish exuded an odor of alcoholic beverage

from his person, and he had a hard time speaking.

His speech

was slurred and repetitive, and his eyes were bloodshot and
glassy.
6.

(Tr-54-57).
When he got out of his car, Appellant had to use

both hands to lift himself from the vehicle, and as he walked
toward the back of the vehicle he had to run his hand along
the side of the car for balance.

_1 c;_

(Tr-56,57).

7.

He attempted to perform three field sobriety tests:

a hand slapping test, a finger counting test, and a straight
line test.

(Tr-61-67).

Mr. Irish failed each test; he:

(a)

was unable to follow the instructions on the hand slapping
test, and he kept hitting one hand two or three times on one
side and joking about the test, even after being shown a
second time how to perform it (Tr-63-65); (b) he tried the
finger counting test, but did not actually count the fingers
but simply recited various numbers at random while sliding his
thumb around his fingers (Tr-64,66); and (c) on attempting the
straight line test, he took four steps with his feet at angles
rather than in a straight line and not touching his heel to
his toe, and then he fell over against his car and stated that
he was finished with the test and did not complete it as
instructed (Tr-66,67).
8.

He was belligerent with the officers using a great

deal of foul and abusive language toward them.
9.

(Tr-78,79).

Based upon all the aforementioned facts and speaking

as a qualified expert with respect to persons under the
influence of alcohol, the arresting officer expressed his
opinion that at the time he stopped Appellant-IrishTs vehicle
Appellant was under the influence of alcohol.
10.

(Tr-68).

Despite the officers? giving Appellant three different

opportunities to take the intoxilyzer test, demonstrating the
test and explaining its functions to him, and reading him a
written admonition as to the possible adverse effects of his
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refusing to take the test, Appellant steadfastly refused to do
so and vulgarly suggested what the officers could do with the
intoxilyzer instrument.
11.

(Tr-68-70 ).

Appellant admitted to drinking two cans of beer prior

to his arrest.

(Tr-105,106 ).

The law is clear that this error committed during trial
will be viewed as harmless error where there is no reasonable
likelihood in the absence of such error that there would have
been a different result.
(Utah 1986).

State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129

See also State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah

1986); State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980).
There is such overwhelming additional evidence in the
instant case to sustain the jury's verdict, that it can be
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that if the statement by
the trial judge complained of by Appellant was error, such
error was harmless.

Further, the error, if any, was not only

harmless but was invited by Appellantfs actions.
POINT III
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALCOHOL AND OF IMPROPER LANE CHANGE
Appellant-Irish argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict that Appellant was
guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and of
improper lane change.

Appellant correctly states the standard

of review regarding sufficiency of evidence, which is that the
court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence

only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime for which he was convicted.
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

(State v. Petree, 659

However, Appellant erroneously

argues that because the defendant at trial provided an
explanation as to each item of evidence introduced to support
the charge that he was driving while under the influence of
alcohol, "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt as to the efficacy of that particular element."
(Appellant's brief, p. 10). The problem with Appellant's
argument is that it does not necessarily follow that because
there may be reasonable explanations for each allegation, the
jury could not disbelieve those explanations and rather find
beyond a reasonable doubt that each item of evidence indicated
the guilt of the accused.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a jury is not
obligated to accept a defendant's protestations of innocence
and that the court will not substitute its judgment for the
jury's verdict when it is supported by substantial evidence.
State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987).

The court

has also said that it may reverse a jury verdict only if,
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict,
there is no substantial evidence to support it.
Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985).

Matter of

There was

certainly substantial competent evidence introduced at the

-i fl-

trial in the instant case to support the jury's verdict, as
set forth in detail in Point II of this argument hereinabove.
POINT IV
APPELLANT-IRISH HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO
RAISE ISSUES ON APPEAL REGARDING COURT'S
INSTRUCTING APPELLANT IN JURY'S PRESENCE
OR REGARDING SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
An examination of the record on appeal, including the
trial transcript, indicates that at no time during the trial
nor thereafter until the filing of the appeal in this matter
did Appellant-Irish make any objection or motion with respect
to either of the issues Appellant now raises on appeal.
This court, and the Utah Supreme Court, have ruled, on
many occasions, that they will not rule on a contention
presented for the first time on appeal.

State v. Chancellor,

704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah
1981), cert den. 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 L.Ed.2d 595
(1981); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.
1987); State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).

See

also State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983), cert den. 464
U.S. 894, 78 L.Ed.2d 231, 104 S.Ct. 241 (1983).
This court should decline to consider either of the
claims of error by Appellant regarding improper reprimand by
the court or regarding insufficiency of evidence as to either
of the violations for which Appellant was convicted.
CONCLUSION
The court's simple instructions to Appellant that he seat
himself and not leave the courtroom without authorization was

an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion to control
courtroom decorum.

It was justified by Appellantfs own

actions, it did not manifest any hostile attitude toward the
defendant, it did not indicate any opinion by the court that
the defendant was guilty, nor did it otherwise suggest a lack
of impartiality on the part of the judge.

If any prejudice

was created in the minds of the jury by the comment, it was
cured by the court's jury instructions.

Even if the court's

comments were prejudicial, such were harmless error in view of
the overwhelming additional evidence of Appellant-Irish's
guilt.

There was certainly sufficient evidence to support the

jury's verdict finding the Appellant guilty of driving under
the influence of alcohol and of improper lane change.
Further, Appellant waived his right to appeal on either the
improper comment issue or the sufficiency of evidence issue.
The conviction should be affirmed and remanded for
execution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / "
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day of July, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Vernice S. Ah Ching,
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, at the Salt Lake City Legal
Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the U. S. mail, postage
prepaid thereon, this

//

day of July, 1989.
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EXHIBIT "A"
INSTRUCTION NO.

These instructions contain the law that governs you in this
case.

In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence

given at this trial. Evidence which was rejected by me or ordered
stricken by me may not be considered by you.
No one of these instructions states all of the law of this
case, but all of them must be taken and considered together inasmuch
as they are connected with and related to each other.
You should not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of
law.

Regardless of your own opinion, it would be a violation of

your sworn duty to base your verdict upon any other view of the law
than that given in my instructions.

EXHIBIT "B"
INSTRUCTION NO.

14

If during this trial the court has said or done anything
which has suggested to you that it is inclined to favor the
claims or position of either party, you will not permit
yourselves to be influence by any such suggestion.
The court has not intended to indicate any opinion as to
which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, nor which party
should prevail.

If any expression has seemed to indicate an

opinion relating to any of these matters, you should disregard
it, because you are the exclusive judges of the facts.

